Transnational Law as Unseen Law by Affolder, Natasha
The Peter A. Allard School of Law 
Allard Research Commons 
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications 
2019 
Transnational Law as Unseen Law 
Natasha Affolder 
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, affolder@allard.ubc.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs 
 Part of the Transnational Law Commons 
Citation Details 
Natasha Affolder, "Transnational Law as Unseen Law" in Peer Zumbansen, ed, The Many Lives of 
Transnational Law: Critical Engagements with Jessup’s Bold Proposal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press [forthcoming in 2020]). 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard 
Research Commons. For more information, please contact petrovic@allard.ubc.ca, elim.wong@ubc.ca. 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS UNSEEN LAW 
NATASHA AFFOLDER* 
 
A. Introduction: Thirteen Words That Changed the World 
B. Transnational Law as a Holding Pen: Jessup’s “Larger Storehouse of Rules” 
C. What is a Practice-Enriched Perspective? 
D. Accessing Transnational Environmental Law’s “Secret Archives” 
I. The Partial Knowledge Base of Arbitration 
II. Tracing Transplants  
III. Judges and the Project of Environmental Law 
IV. The Private Lives of Contractual Texts 
E. Conclusion: From Seen/Unseen to Known/Unknowable 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION: THIRTEEN WORDS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 
With thirteen words in the Storrs Lecture in 1956, Philip Jessup created an incurable itch 
for legal scholars.1 This itch emerges from a conception of Transnational Law that was 
at once clarifying and obscuring in its specification that “public and private international 
law are included as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard 
categories.”2 With these words, Jessup expressed discontent with the inadequacy of 
existing terminology and approaches to conceptualizing border-crossing law. He flagged 
the profound misalignment between a solely state-mediated view of law underlying much 
international legal theory and his own experience of law in the world. In so doing, he 
created space to acknowledge law’s other sources, legal rules and sources of knowledge 
about law that matter in practice but ill-fit standard categories. Usefully, Jessup did not 
offer a restrictive list of what these misfits might be. The concept of Transnational Law 
he advanced was therefore not so much a singular and fully embellished fait accompli as 
it was the refreshing creation of a new intellectual holding pen for ideas about law and its 
border-crossing movements.  
Part of the allure of Jessup’s description of transnational law lies in its promise of 
capturing something beyond the visible bodies of public and private international law – 
                                                          
* I am grateful to the organizers and participants of “Jessup’s Bold Proposal: Engagements with 
‘Transnational Law’ after Sixty Years” for stimulating these ideas and ongoing conservations. I also 
thank Nicholas Healey for his excellent research assistance. 
1 Philip C. Jessup, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Yale University Press, 1956) [Jessup]. 
2 Id, at 2. 
in its invocation to uncover unseen law, other law, law that is important in practice but 
neglected in scholarship. There have been many recent attempts to frame and name this 
unseen law: through raising awareness of informal international law-making,3 in 
identifying the turn to stealthier means of transnational legal ordering,4 by revealing the 
“hidden world” of WTO governance,5 by disclosing the “hidden tools” that populate 
international investment law,6 and in unveiling the obscured interactions of private 
international law on public international law.7 Such contributions emerge in studies 
variously described as international, transnational, comparative, and global. Yet they 
invoke a Jessup-inspired approach to transnational law in the sense that they draw on “a 
larger storehouse of rules to apply” and fail to “worry whether public or private law 
applies in certain cases.”8  
Vocabularies of visibility and invisibility continue to permeate transnational law 
discourse.  Jessup’s project of “illuminating a transnational space”9 addresses “the empty 
space left by the existing doctrinal perspectives”.10 Transnational law is “a lens” through 
which particular relationships between national laws become visible.11  Bringing 
transnational law “into view” demands seeing transnational law as a whole, if not, “then 
many of its features will be lost to sight, the programmatic development of the system 
will be obscured, and the systematic absence of concern for legality and human rights 
will be hidden.”12 In such a way, transnational law, whether viewed predominantly as a 
                                                          
3 J. Pauwelyn, R. A. Wessel & J. Wouters, INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
4 G. Shaffer & C. Coye, From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law, From Transnational 
Law to Transnational Legal Orders, UC IRVINE SCHOOL OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2017-02. (cross-
reference to Shaffer’s chapter if it is included in this volume at p. 17). 
5 A. Lang & J. Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20:3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 575–614 (2009). 
6 P. Fox & C. Rosenberg, The Hidden Tool in a Foreign Investor’s Toolbox: The Trade Preference 
Program as a ‘Carrot and Stick’ to Secure Compliance with International Law Obligations, 34 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 53–80 (2013). 
7 A. Mills, Rediscovering the Public Dimension of Private International Law, 24 HAGUE YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–23 (2011); A. Mills, Variable Geometry, Peer Governance, and the Public 
International Perspective on Private International Law, in: H. Muir Watt and D. Fernández Arroyo 
(eds.), PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Oxford University Press, 2014), 245–
261. 
8 Jessup, supra note 1, at 15. 
9 B. Bowling and J. Sheptycki, Global Policing and Transnational Rule with Law, 6:1 TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL THEORY (2015) 141-173, 146. 
10 G-P. Calliess and P. Zumbansen, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) at 11. 
11 P. Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance and Legal 
Pluralism 21 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (2012) 305, at 307. 
12 Neil Boister, Further Reflections on the Concept of Transnational Criminal Law, 6:1 TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL THEORY (2015) 9-30, at 30. 
body of substantive law or as a methodology, implicates an enlarging of law’s vision 
field.  
Despite the appetite for viewing border-crossing law in expansive ways, the task of 
making visible the actualities of law and practice comprising transnational law involves 
slippery methodological questions that legal scholars seem particularly skilled at 
sidestepping. Jessup himself invoked the need to more fully capture an expansive view 
of the sources of international law, and suggested some unconventional methods for 
elucidating these sources.13 Neither Jessup nor the scholars who have individually taken 
up the task of revealing hidden aspects of transnational law, though, have squarely tackled 
the question of how best to address not only the unseen aspects of transnational law but 
also the disparity between the known and the unknowable.   
This short chapter takes some first steps towards filling this gap. First, the chapter 
examines the intellectual holding pen created by Jessup for other rules and sources of 
law, his “larger storehouse of rules”. While this initiative was firmly aimed at expanding 
the view of law to see beyond the state and to center practice in its vision field, the tools 
and methods for studying and elucidating such a vision of law remain unclear. Second, 
the chapter interrogates the meaning of the practice-enriched perspective that 
transnational law claims to deliver, arguing that those who invoke practice in fact mean 
many different things. Finally, the chapter grounds its somewhat abstract reflections on 
visibility and invisibility in an examination of the difference such issues make to 
transnational environmental law research. By identifying four “black boxes” that limit 
access to knowledge, the challenge of discovering unseen law becomes more apparent. 
Jessup himself acknowledged the partiality of the peek-a-boo views of transnational 
processes that populate scholarship.14 Emerging from an awareness that the transnational 
law “lens” delivers but a selective view, and that forms and manifestations of legal 
knowledge continue to elude us, are tantalizing possibilities for future research. 
  
                                                          
13 Jessup offered methodological suggestions as to how transnational law could be mapped by scholars, 
drawing on “useful precedents” from maritime law including usages, codes, conferences, practices 
“codified by the voluntary action of shipping interests”, inclusion of rules in bills of lading, and the 
adoption of identical domestic legislation in maritime states: Jessup, supra note 1, at 109–110. 
14 Jessup, for example, noted the challenges in accessing “secret archives” and the barriers on new 
knowledge imposed by “unfamiliar scientific terminology” and “official security classifications.”: P.C. 
Jessup & H.J. Taubenfeld, Outer Space, Antarctica, and the United Nations, 13:3 INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 363–379, 363 (1959) [Jessup & Taubenfeld]. 
B.  TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS AN INTELLECTUAL HOLDING PEN: 
JESSUP’S “LARGER STOREHOUSE OF RULES” 
In the sixty years that have passed since the Storrs Lecture, scholars have flocked to 
Jessup’s definition of transnational law as a safe haven – a place for exploring the multiple 
sites and manifestations of transnational legality that comprise “all law which regulates 
actions or events that transcend national frontiers”.15 Transnational Law has become a 
form of intellectual shorthand, a terminology that unites scholars who share a 
dissatisfaction with versions of public international law that are too limited in their vision, 
too erasing of people, places, sites of law-making, and sources of knowledge about law. 
Transnational Law equally provides respite from a view of private international law that 
is too blind to its public facing and political dimensions. Not surprisingly, much of the 
intellectual energy that has emerged in transnational law scholarship is based on critique 
(both explicit and implicit) of what non-transnational law misses.  
The resulting shared project of mapping and understanding the interactions between 
private and public, and the intermeshing of state and non-state actors in law-making, has 
worked to advance Jessup’s aspiration of engaging with actualities, and to fill the “gaps” 
in knowledge that Jessup’s concept of transnational law hinted at but failed to definitively 
diagnose. These compulsions are expressed not only in scholarship that self-identifies 
with a transnational law label, but can be seen in recent public international law and 
private international law literatures that aim to better elucidate how international law 
“works in practice”.16 
Jessup’s unwillingness to define and restrict the “larger storehouse of rules” he evoked in 
defining transnational law was a genius move. It effectively secured transnational law’s 
enduring appeal by hinting at this term’s ongoing capacity to capture a wider vision field. 
Transnational law has secured its place in legal thought by serving, given this flexibility, 
as a much-needed placeholder for contemporary anxieties. It has created space for 
scholars yearning to better reflect the important, diverse, and intermeshed roles of the 
state and non-state in law-making, to reject compartmentalized views of public and 
private international law, to take practice seriously as a source of both norms and legal 
                                                          
15 Jessup, supra note 1, at 2. 
16 See e.g. Gráinne de Búrca, Human Rights Experimentalism, 111:2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 277–316 (2017). This compulsion can also be traced through scholarship on global 
legal pluralism, global administrative law, transnational legal process, transnational legal orders, trans-
governmental regulatory networks, international organizations as lawmakers, and new legal realism and 
international law. 
knowledge, and to embrace a plurality of legal sources in capturing the “larger storehouse 
of legal rules”.17  
But framing an inquiry as “transnational” does not only reveal previous blind spots. It 
also provides an opportunity to reintroduce or perpetuate partial visions of law. A 
transnational law framing will emphasize certain ideas, inquiries, and actors at the 
expense of others. While it is easy to applaud the task of more expansively covering law 
“as it is experienced in the world”, it is harder to soberly measure how well scholars are 
achieving this goal. It is, however, evident that there is a scholarly appetite for seeking to 
make visible obscured dimensions of law’s function and features as it crosses borders. An 
example of this is a recent study of commercial lawmaking within the United Nations that 
describes itself in this way: 
We focus on the least visible of lawmaking institutions: international 
organizations that function more like legislatures… As an empirical investigation, 
this book penetrates the zones of invisibility that cloud the production of legal 
norms that govern international commerce and trade.18   
Feminist scholarship provides a useful reminder to those contemplating transnational 
law’s selective gaze of the potentially problematic nature of both visibility and 
invisibility. Marginalized groups are often shown to occupy positions of hyper-visibility19 
while the experiences of dominant communities enjoy a claim to universality as the 
hegemonic norm that conceals their domination.20 In other situations, feminists describe 
invisibility as a situation of marginalization21 from which women, and particularly certain 
groups of women, are deprived of political agency. A central occupation for many 
feminist scholars is identifying the unknown, and in response, making known what is 
hidden by legal processes.22 Feminist theory thus offers an ever-present reminder that 
                                                          
17 Jessup, supra note 1 at 15. 
18 S Block-Lieb and TC Halliday, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS (Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 23 (emphasis mine). 
19 S. Arat-Koç, Invisibilized, Individualized, and Culturalized: Paradoxical Invisibility and Hyper-
Visibility of Gender in Policy Making and Policy Discourse in Neoliberal Canada, 29:3 CANADIAN 
WOMAN STUDIES 6–18 (2012). 
20 R. Simpson & P. Lewis, An Investigation of Silence and a Scrutiny of Transparency: Re-examining 
Gender in Organization Literature through the Concepts of Voice and Visibility, 58:10 HUMAN 
RELATIONS 1253–1275, 1263–1264 (2005). 
21 M. Yamada, Invisibility is an Unnatural Disaster: Reflections of an Asian American Woman, in: C. 
Moraga & G. Anzaldúa (eds.), THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF 
COLOR (SUNY Press, 1981), 35. 
22 See R. Ahlers & M, Zwarteveen, The Water Question in Feminism: Water Control and Gender 
Inequities in a Neo-Liberal Era, 16:4 GENDER PLACE AND CULTURE 409–426, 414–416 (2009) (exposing 
the practices of water resource management through which neo-liberal discourse renders unseen the 
facts, events, vocabularies, outcomes, processes and people can all be erased by 
methodological choices and starting points.  
Mariana Valverde’s Chronotopes of Law identifies how a scale shift in feminist legal 
thought to embrace the transnational has, perhaps unintentionally, relegated certain 
feminist critiques to the background. These include feminist critiques of marriage and 
unpaid housework.23 A shift in scale to the transnational tends to focus attention on 
‘flows, networks and governance assemblages’24 and divert attention away from the 
individual people who comprise these processes.25 This work is a powerful reminder that 
a scale shift, such as that to the transnational in studying law, does not only lead to 
productive new fields of vision, it also implies abandoning other sights and sites of legal 
activity. Feminist critiques of “the male gaze” highlight the stakes that are implicated in 
the very act of seeing.26 
C. WHAT IS A PRACTICE-ENRICHED PERSPECTIVE? 
Practice is a single word that denotes many things. It is invoked so often and in so many 
different ways that it is worth spending some time thinking about why and how scholars 
use ‘practice’ and ‘practices’ to illuminate law and legal processes. Jessup’s own appeal 
to the practical was not singular. He invokes practice in multiple ways, including 1) 
through focusing on problems applicable to the ‘complex interrelated world 
community’27 (the lived reality of law) 2) by appealing to practitioner knowledge (what 
lawyers know), 3) by drawing on his own diplomatic and government experience 
(personal experience of international diplomacy), 2) by clarifying that law’s problems 
transcend legal sub-disciplines (highlighting the practical need for intra-disciplinary 
problem-solving) 4) with alertness to the extra-legal (arguing that law includes processes 
that go beyond adjudication such as business negotiations and re-negotiations),28 5) 
                                                          
political nature of decision-making); F. Johns, The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An 
Analysis of International Law and Legal Theory, 19 MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 893–923, 
917–919 (1994) (employing feminist critiques of the public/private divide and jurisdictional doctrines to 
reveal how transnational corporations hide their damaging exploitation of women’s labour). 
23 M. Valverde, CHRONOTOPES OF LAW: JURISDICTION, SCALE AND GOVERNANCE (Routledge, 2015), 106 
[Valverde]. 
24 Id. 
25 N Affolder, Transnational Environmental Law’s ‘Missing People’, 8 TRANSNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2019) (forthcoming). 
26 Valverde, supra note 23 at 58. 
27 Jessup, supra note 1 at 1. 
28 Jessup, supra note 1 at 6. (“One notes that the problem of extracting and refining oil in Iran may 
involve - as it has - Iranian law, English law, and public international law. Procedurally it may involve - 
as it has - diplomatic negotiations, proceedings in the International Court of Justice and in the Security 
Council, business negotiations with and among oil companies, and action in the Iranian Majlis.”) 
employing an explicit attempt to align legal concepts and their definition with ‘realities’ 
(law in action),29 and 6) by applauding those scholars and judges whose work has a 
practical real-world impact on international politics.30  
These multiple uses of practice can all be seen in the Storrs Lecture. In that lecture, Jessup 
explicitly distinguishes his own approach to law from that of Grotius who detached 
himself from “every particular fact”, agreeing with a characterization of Grotius as “a 
scholar, and his only authority was that of a scholar.”31 While Jessup, like many others, 
implies that “practice” gives one “authority” beyond that of a scholar, the nature of that 
authority and the qualification threshold for claiming it, remain underspecified.  
Beyond invoking the value of legal practice and citing diplomatic experience as 
informing real world knowledge, Jessup suggests that rules emanate from “practices” as 
diverse as those of General Motors, secret societies, towns, cities, states.32 Jessup did not 
himself include the word “practices” in his own definition of Transnational Law in the 
Storrs Lecture. Yet subsequent scholars have made such an insertion, claiming that 
“’Law’ for Jessup is composed of all rules and practices which regulate actions and 
events”.33 
In the sixty years since Jessup’s Storrs’ lecture, appeals to practice in legal scholarship 
appear to have multiplied. The common vocabulary of practice, and practices, circulating 
through this scholarship may hide the fact that quite different things are being invoked: 
‘law in action’ as opposed to ‘law on the books’, an understanding of law common to 
law’s practitioners as opposed to “detached” scholars, the real world of international 
politics and diplomacy, social practices of institutions and groups of non-state actors. 
Indeed, as legal scholarship exhibits a growing comfort with sociolegal and ethnographic 
methodologies that seek to understand law through social practices, it remains difficult to 
elucidate whether the ‘practices’ being referred to are indeed seen as social practices, 
legal practices, or something else entirely. Unfortunately, the language of practice seems 
to be invoked somewhat more often than effort is put into articulating what is indicated 
by it. And at times, invoking “practical relevance” is simply an undisguised critique of 
                                                          
29 Jessup, supra note 1 at 7. He thus approvingly quotes Justice Cardozo’s own Storrs Lecture: “Law and 
obedience to law are facts confirmed every day to us all in our experience of life. If the result of a 
definition is to make them seem to be illusions, so much the worse for the definition; we must enlarge it 
till it is broad enough to answer to realities.” 
30 Jessup, supra note 1 at 10-11, acknowledging that Grotius “and succeeding scholars have not been 
without their influence on developments in international politics”. 
31 Jessup, supra note 1 at 10 (quoting Max Rodin). 
32 Jessup, supra note 1 at 9. 
33 N. de B. Katzenbach, Transnational Law (Review) 24 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 
(1957) 413-417, at 413 (emphasis mine). 
the lack of utility of theory. Such uses accompany calls to redirect legal scholars to the 
mission of serving “the profession”, invoking past glory days when law professors were: 
strictly at the service of the practical profession – the judges and practicing 
lawyers. Law professors aspired to Utility rather than Truth. Their demeanor and 
attire were professional, worldly (as were their incomes), in comparison to the 
mild bohemianism by which the true don proclaimed (and proclaims) his 
independence from the quotidian.34 
Simply put, legal scholarship seems to have sidestepped the detailed methodological 
debates that have marked the “practice turns” in other disciplines such as international 
relations or history.35 The consequence is that legal practice tends to be invoked as some 
non-contentious and non-political body of common knowledge without being subjected 
to the usual questions of legitimacy given to sources of law, and sources of knowledge 
about law. Practice, in such a way, acquires an assumed, rather than an up-for-debate, 
rationality.  The reason that the methods for studying, or revealing, practice matter, in 
particular, to a collection of essays exploring Jessup’s legacy, is that a practice-informed 
perspective was so central to Jessup’s vision of transnational law. The value of studying 
practices to reveal unconscious knowledges that might be taken for granted or obscured, 
and unseen dynamics of socialization,36 remain no less relevant to current transnational 
law scholarship. 
The fact that the meaning, and particular authority, resident in law’s practice-claims 
remains little explored suggests that there is room for more explicit scholarly discussion 
about how lawyers and legal scholars, and which ones, get to access and represent legal 
practice in producing those more complete/accurate/true to life visions and versions of 
law that “practice-informed perspectives” claim, at least implicitly, to provide. Who gets 
to draw on the experience of their own lives with a sense that their experience of practice 
is of more than anecdotal value? As legal scholars, do we unwittingly reproduce very 
selective “practice-informed perspectives” by our unspoken assumptions as to whose 
practice and whose perspective on that practice is worth capturing in text? Do we need to 
adopt more deliberate, and different, methodologies to ensure that varied, diverse, and 
thus widely representative “practice-informed perspectives” are shared? And what is it 
                                                          
34 RA. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today 45 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1647, at 1648 (1993). 
35 J. Kustermans, Parsing the Practice Turn: Practice, Practical Knowledge, Practices, 44:2 
MILLENNIUM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 175–196 (2016). 
36 T Schatzki, Introduction: Practice Theory in T Schatzki, K Cetina, and E von Savigny, eds, THE 
PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY (Routledge, 2001) 10 at 13; M Polyakov, Practice Theories: 
The Latest Turn in Historiography? (2012) 6 J Phil Hist 218 at 218-219. 
exactly that a practice-informed perspective is seeking to offer – a fuller, wider, or just 
different, vision of law, or a more ‘true to life’ vision, and if so true to whose life? 
Many of these anxieties trace to the fact that legal scholarship can be marked by 
methodological timidity, and sometimes even an aversion to saying much at all about 
methodological choices. Fleur Johns’ Non-Legality in International Law is a wonderful 
example of a book shaped and coloured by Johns’ experience in range of practice settings, 
including corporate practice in New York. By referencing her own prior experience in 
legal practice as a research methodology, she uses the term ‘quasi-ethnography’, a term 
coined by social scientists seeking to note the limits of their ethnographic studies.37 By 
being explicit about the practice base upon which she personally draws, Johns’ references 
to practice take on greater meaning and clarity. Other scholars find ways to clarify their 
conceptions of practice and practices, by defining practices by what they are not. For 
example, human rights scholars differentiate practices of human rights from human rights 
discourses, taking care to note that the two are mutually constitutive.38  
Ethnographic work has illuminated the difference a practice-informed perspective makes 
in the sense of revealing law through its “lived practices and techniques”.39 Such work, 
for example, allows scholars to adjust where they direct their gaze in understand global 
supply chains, revealing the importance of detailed scrutiny of practices that occur not 
only in but around the chain.40 Studying legal knowledge in this way can involve looking 
at quite diverse sites of practice, including viewing law as the product of specialized 
elites,41 or analyzing law as the product of automation and routinized practices.42 As 
transnational sites of knowledge production increasingly attract the interest of legal 
scholars, law’s visual field is adjusted by a willingness to examine how legal knowledge 
is formed through material practices. 
                                                          
37 F. Johns, NON-LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge, 2013) 22; See B. Owen, IN THE MIX: 
STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL IN A WOMEN’S PRISON (SUNY Press, 1998). 
38 M Goodale, Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and the Local in M. Goodale and 
SE Merry eds, THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE 
LOCAL (Cambridge, 2007) 1-38, at 18. This chapter title again draws on the language of visibility in its 
exercise of envisioning law. 
39 See SE Merry, New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law 31:4 LAW & SOCIAL 
INQUIRY (2006) 975-995. 
40 See B Reinke and P Zumbansen, Transnational Liability Regimes in Contract, Tort, and Comparative 
Law: Comparative Observations on ‘Global Supply Chain Liability’ in S Schiller (ed.) LE DEVOIR DE LA 
VIGILANCE (Lexis Nexis 2019). 
41 Y. Dezalay and BG Garth, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS (University of Chicago 
Press, 2002).  
42 See e.g. A. Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Market (2011) 230; 
Johns, supra note 37 at 64. 
Many of the scholars writing practice-inspired accounts of international law and 
transnational regulation do so after a career-long engagement with practice and draw on 
their own lives in creating practice-informed perspectives. Martti Koskenniemi, for 
example, has explicitly drawn attention to the importance of his long career practicing 
international law with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping the starting 
points for From Apology to Utopia.43 David Kennedy, a scholar whose own writing is 
animated by deep suspicions about expert rule and its tendency to marginalize 
opportunities for contestation, writes in an anecdote-rich way that reveals the depth of his 
expertise, his networks, and his experience in professional practice.44  
While personal experience-rich accounts such as Kennedy’s, and monumental interview-
based and practice-reflecting texts like John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos’ Global 
Business Regulation, provide models of practice-informed scholarly writing, they are 
exceptional examples of such work. Kennedy provides a rich view of the “field” from 
social and professional interactions without the interruptions of footnotes denoting 
interview numbers and ethics approvals, but, in reality, produced based on unparalleled 
access to both grassroots and elite military, economic, and humanitarian actors. 
Braithwaite and Drahos document a decade-long process of interviewing 500 
“international leaders in business and government”.45 They explain the purpose of 
undertaking such a monumental number of interviews as revealing “what the formal 
language of international intellectual property agreements does not: the informal dynamic 
of power that determines the choice of words, their meaning, and subsequent 
utilization.”46 
Jessup’s conception of transnational law presents us with the challenge of creating 
“practice informed” perspectives of law. Such a task demands being explicit about how 
we are creating these accounts. What methodological safeguards might ensure that the 
visions of practice that do inform accounts of transnational law do not unwittingly 
reproduce the very patterns of privilege and marginalization of sources of knowledge that 
                                                          
43 M. Koskenniemi, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), 562. 
44 D. Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the Politics of 
Expertise, 5 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 463–497 (2001); D. Kennedy, A WORLD OF 
STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (Princeton 
University Press, 2016), p. 2; D. Kennedy, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (Princeton University Press, 2004), xvi. 
45 J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
46 P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE INFORMATION ECONOMY? 
(Oxford University Press, 2002), preface. 
they seek to address? Acknowledging that there are “black boxes” of knowledge about 
law, the task of the next section, might be one first step. 
D. ACCESSING TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW’S 
“SECRET ARCHIVES” 
The next section of the chapter looks to some concrete challenges in realizing the Jessup-
inspired ideal, a version of practice-informed, problem-addressing transnational law. 
Jessup did not hesitate to acknowledge the gaps in public and private international law, 
nor the impediments to accessing information contained in “secret archives”.47 He was 
not explicit about what those “secret archives” were but cited scientific knowledge and 
official security classifications as examples.48 Applying the idea of “secret archives” to 
the research context of the contemporary transnational environmental law scholar, I 
explore below four examples of “black boxes” that limit access to knowledge. They are 
far from an exhaustive list of problem areas for accessing rich and full views of 
transnational legal problems. A more complete list might more comprehensively target 
the geographic imbalances of the available data of “global” environmental law, the 
consequences of language barriers (and English-language defaults), search engine biases 
(and online-research defaults), the obscuring of environmental issues most pressing to 
women, the ways in which environmental terminology is complicated by disparate 
meanings, and the absence of indigenous law in accounts of global environmental law 
processes. 
Indeed, transnational environmental law presents a particularly rich venue for observing 
such tensions up close. For scholars interested in environmental problems, accessing the 
specialized knowledge of different regimes (trade, investment, intellectual property, 
international criminal law) requires confronting immediate challenges. Fragmentation, 
and the resulting limits of “insider knowledge”, make it harder to know what scholars fail 
to see, and what sources are “hidden from view”.49 The challenges of classifying various 
aspects of “global background law”50 or “fuzzy law”51 that populate environmental law 
practice explain the allure of Jessup’s transnational law terminology as a “catch-all”. 
                                                          
47 Jessup & Taubenfeld, supra note 14, at 363. 
48 Id. 
49 See N. Affolder, Looking for Law in Unusual Places: Cross-Border Diffusion of Environmental Norms, 
7:3 TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 425–449 (2018) [Affolder]. 
50 R. Michaels, The UNIDROIT Principles as Global Background Law, 19:4 UNIFORM LAW REVIEW 
643–668 (2014). 
51 O. Perez, Fuzzy Law: A Theory of Quasi-Legality, in: P. Glenn & L. Smith (eds.), LAW AND THE NEW 
LOGICS (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 236. 
I. The Partial Knowledge Base of Arbitration 
In transnational law scholarship, international arbitration (both investment arbitration and 
international commercial arbitration) has occupied a privileged place as providing 
precisely that “larger storehouse of rules” that Jessup invoked. International arbitration is 
a familiar area of study for those explicitly adopting a transnational law lens in their work, 
and well fits the practice-informed, problem-addressing, public/private divide jumping 
context set out by Jessup as transnational law’s domain. Transnational environmental law 
scholars eager to capture the influence of these legal rules on environmental problems, 
though, remain stymied by the limits on access to information from and about arbitral 
processes. 
Many scholarly works on arbitration treat transparency as a normative issue,52 rather than 
focusing descriptively on what information is available, and what remains off-limits to 
the public and interested researchers. Scholars thus argue that while “arbitral decision-
making of yesteryear occurred in a virtual black box” … “[t]oday the situation is quite 
different.”53 This comment seems to include both international commercial arbitration 
and investor-state arbitration in its scope while the transparency issues at stake in each 
form of arbitration differ.54 The cited improvements in the transparency of arbitral 
processes most often relate to reforms making “the rules that regulate decision-making” 
more readily available to interested parties, and to the growing number of voluntary and 
involuntary disclosures.55 While these reforms may go some way to disclosing 
information on challenges to arbitrators and creating clearer guidance on arbitrator 
standards of conduct, they do little to increase the disclosure to interested scholars of what 
disputes are reaching arbitration. 
At the same time as scholars are reporting that more arbitral awards are being voluntarily 
published,56 it is impossible to know what “tip of the iceberg” these awards represent. 
                                                          
52 This scholarship traces back to the detailed case for the publication of arbitration awards made in 
J.D.M. Lew, The Case for the Publication of Arbitration Awards, in: J.C. Schultz & J. van den Berg 
(eds.), THE ART OF ARBITRATION (Springer, 1982), 22–42; and T.E. Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral 
Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International Transactions, 23:3 COLUMBIA 
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 579–614 (1985). 
53 C.A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration 54 UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS LAW 
REVIEW 1301–1338, 1312–1313 (2006). 
54 Rogers usefully canvasses the multiple possible means of transparency. Id. 
55 Id, at 1313. 
56 See D.M. Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration: The Need for 
Procedural and Structural Reform, 41:3 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 923–964, 959 
(2003) (“Today, several arbitral institutions, as well as independent publishers, have started to regularly 
publish arbitral awards.”) 
Ginsburg notes that the subset of awards that are published represents “an explicitly 
biased sample” as the International Chamber of Commerce, for example, seeks to publish 
“particularly interesting or unusual awards.”57 But for non-experts it may be the 
“uninteresting” and “usual” awards that equally illuminate. It is easy to calculate that 
there is a large disparity between the sparse number of published awards and the 
documented caseload of arbitral institutions which shows thousands of arbitrations taking 
place each year.58  
For environmental law research, this offers many dead ends. While the attractiveness of 
arbitration as a venue for resolving environmental disputes is widely advertised,59 it is 
challenging to discover how often arbitration clauses are used, how many environmental 
disputes (or commercial disputes that include environmental issues) ever reach an arbitral 
panel, and if so with what results. This limits an awareness of how partial, or how 
representative, discussions of arbitral practices are when they draw on a small sample of 
reported cases. Further, as still little is known about the composition of the “invisible 
college” of arbitrators,60 the extent to which arbitrators possess, or are open to, specialized 
environmental and scientific knowledge remains unknown. 
An added challenge emerges from the patterns of redaction common to arbitral reporting 
that complicate searching environmental content, reducing carbon trading to “services” 
and environmental goods to “products”. In practice, the much-applauded reforms to 
disclosure that are in the interests of parties and voluntarily introduced might not be the 
same sort of reforms needed to produce more informed and robust knowledge. Interview-
based studies help elucidate hidden aspects of arbitral practice, yet they run into some of 
the same problems of “trust me” default visions of expertise described above. The 
challenge then is not simply that knowledge about arbitration remains out of reach, but 
that it is difficult to know how little one knows. 
  
                                                          
57 T. Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1335–
1346, 1340 (2003). 
58 Such data is reproduced in J. Jemielniak, LEGAL INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (Routledge, 2014), 91. 
59 Carbon Mission, THE LAWYER, 28 October 2009, available at 
<https://www.thelawyer.com/issues/online/carbon -mission/>. 
60 S. D. Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible College” of Arbitration, 53 
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (2015) 429-506 (offering a ‘glimpse’ of this college 
through disaggregating data on conference attendance). 
II. Tracing Transplants  
Scholars alert to transnational environmental law’s movements are increasingly attentive 
to the movement of environmental law ideas, models, and forms across borders.61 
Discourses of diffusion, emphasizing and assuming environmental law’s transferability, 
have become central to the way in which new environmental law ideas and approaches 
are developed and communicated.62 Yet the tasks of tracing the movement of law and its 
underlying ideas are impeded by the many forces which obscure the processes by which 
transnational influences shape both the substance of legislative “transplants” and 
legislative drafting processes.  
For example, a 2017 Climate Legislation Study calculated that more than 1,200 laws to 
curb climate change have now been passed, an increase from about 60 laws in place two 
decades ago.63 Econometric research drawing on this dataset of legislation points to the 
practice of international policy diffusion whereby the climate action a country undertakes 
is likely to depend on prior climate legislation by other countries.64 While these assertions 
are made and justified by regressing climate legislation against the number of laws passed 
in all other countries in the sample, little analysis is made of the pressures shaping 
legislative form and content.65 Such studies make valuable contributions to an 
understanding of the proliferation of climate laws, but they also point to the underlying 
methodological challenges implicit in trying to provide a comprehensive “global” image 
of legislative activity, as well as a dynamic image of how law moves from place to place, 
and why. Moreover, they reveal how hard it is to come up with a satisfactory definition 
of what counts as climate legislation.  
Attempts to trace diffusion of environmental law models contribute to understandings of 
global power dynamics, and national influence. The EU’s claimed position of climate 
leadership can thus be partially traced to its creation of models capable of transplantation 
                                                          
61 N. Affolder, Contagious Environmental Lawmaking, 31:2 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 187-212 
(2019); J. B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of 
Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY LQ 1295–1372 (2001). 
62 For example, Peel and Osofsky contemplate existing rights-based judgments as offering a ‘model or 
inspiration’ for climate litigation decisions in other jurisdictions. J. Peel & H. Osofsky, A Rights Turn in 
Climate Litigation 7:1 TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 37–67, 37 (2018). 
63 M. Nachmany, S. Fankhauser, J. Setzer & A. Averchenkova, GLOBAL TRENDS IN CLIMATE CHANGE 
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 
2017), 4. 
64 S. Fankhauser, C. Gennaioli, & M. Collins, Do International Factors Influence the Passage of Climate 
Change Legislation? 16:3 CLIMATE POLICY 318–331 (2016). 
65 A. Boute, The Impossible Transplant of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: The Challenge of Energy 
Market Regulation, 6:1 TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 59–85 (2017) [Boute]. 
elsewhere.66 The EU’s Emission Trading Scheme has served as a model for many 
countries looking to introduce the legal infrastructure necessary for domestic carbon 
markets. But it is a model that is proving challenging to export.67 In other areas of 
transnational environmental law, accounts of “borrowing” European law models for 
environmental legislation are equally easy to find,68 but largely unsystematic, and often 
reveal examples rather than “thick description” of how these models were tailored for 
local needs. Rarely on offer is a view of how such one might adjust or fine-tune these 
universal or borrowed prescriptions to particular local contexts.69 This gap reveals the 
larger challenge for environmental law research emerging from limited qualitative and 
quantitative data on the environmental law practices of non-OECD countries.70 
These issues go further to the point that legislative drafting processes generally operate 
in a context of limited transparency and under a veil of secrecy. In many countries, the 
confidentiality of legislative drafting materials is protected through statutes.71 This 
prevents a full understanding of the significance of transnational influences on the 
domestic enactment of environmental legislation. The reality of such transnational 
influence must instead be gleaned from reports of the practice of drafting including either 
voluntary or mandatory consideration of international “best practices”,72 reliance on 
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Force You to), in: E. Morgera (ed.), THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
EU AND INTERNATIONAL LAW DIMENSIONS (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 115–148. 
67 Boute, supra note 65. 
68 Jörgens, for example, traces the influence of European concepts of sustainable development through 
“diffusion” of global policies, documenting the key role of the World Bank. H. Jörgens, Governance by 
Diffusion: Implementing Global Norms Through Cross-National Imitation and Learning, in: W. Lafferty 
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safety code. J. Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the 
Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction, 57:4 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 897–942, 
910–912.  
69 This despite a long history of recognition that the failure of decades of “law and development” 
initiatives can be traced to a blindness to addressing localized contexts and challenges.  
70 For example, a recent book review of an edited environmental governance collection explains the 
dominant focus on the experience of OECD countries in this “comparative work” as not due to the OECD 
countries’ historic responsibility for climate change, but rather due to the “availability of data on these 
countries”: J. Barandiaran, Review of Duit, Andreas, ed. 2014. State and Environment: The Comparative 
Study of Environmental Governance, 16:1 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 108–109, 109 (2016). 
71 For example, provisions limit access to these materials for 90 years in New Zealand, 100 years in the 
province of Ontario, and (with possible redactions) after 30 years in the United Kingdom. S. Tomlinson, 
Public Access to Legislative Drafting Files, 21:1 RECORDS MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 28–35, 28, 33 
(2011). 
72 The Kenya Law Reform Commission’s Guide to the Legislative Process in Kenya prescribes 
“[undertaking] comparative research to ensure that the draft legislative instrument benefits from 
international best practices” as a step in drafting bills. Kenya Law Reform Commission, A GUIDE TO THE 
foreign legislative drafting consultants,73 the sponsorship of drafting initiatives by 
international financial institutions and international organizations,74 “study tours” of 
other countries to inform climate legislation,75 job advertisements for international 
consultancy work on legislative drafting,76 and the curricula of international legislative 
drafting conferences77 and graduate training programs78. Yet these sources still afford 
only a partial glimpse of such practices. 
Authors who “divulge” transnational influences and processes shaping their own 
legislative drafting experiences do so in the spirit of describing their work rather than 
through formalized research studies. The very few empirical studies of legislative drafting 
processes, such as Gluck and Bressman’s interview-based analysis of US Congressional 
practices, only confirms the methodological difficulties with gaining access to the 
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publications/562-a-guide-to-the-legislative-process-in-kenya>. Moldova’s Law on Legislative Acts 
includes a similar provision requiring comparative analysis of the proposed bill with “useful information 
contained in the legislation of other countries, and principles of main systems of the world applied”: T. 
St. John & N. Bates, Legislating for Drafting: The Moldavian Experience, 30:2 STATUTE LAW REVIEW 
123–139, 125–126 (2009). 
73 Nain discusses Fiji’s reliance on foreign legal drafters since the former colony gained independence. N. 
Nain, Teaching Legislative Drafting: The Pacific Experience, 1:1 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING AND LAW REFORM 28–34, 29 (2012). 
74 UNEP’s Partnership for the Development of Environmental Law and Institutions in Africa has been 
influential in developing national environmental laws in Africa. E. Kasimbazi, Application of 
International Standards in Drafting Environmental Legislation and Law Reform Projects: The African 
Experience, 1:1 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING AND LAW REFORM 10–27 (2012). 
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pollution legislation, China’s framework Environmental Protection Law, and Land Administration and 
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LEGISLATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Asian Development Bank, 2000). 
75 Stritih and Simonič comment on the “study tour” of the UK undertaken by members of government and 
expert advisors tasked with producing Slovenia’s climate change legislation. J. Stritih and B. Simonič, 
Drafting a Climate Change Act: Lessons Learned, 42:1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 46–49, 46 
(2012). 
76 UN Careers, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE BILL, MBABANE, available at 
<https://uncareer.net/ vacancy/legislative-drafting-climate-change-bill-consultancy-mbabane>. 
77 See e.g. Fourth International Conference on Legislation and Law Reform (Washington: World Bank, 
November 17–18, 2016) which included sessions on Legislative Drafting for Sustainable Development 
and the Importance of Drafting in Implementing Sustainable Development Goals. Available at 
<https://ilegis.org/files/iLegis-2016-Agenda.pdf>. 
78 Nagoya University School of Law advertises a programme in Cross-Border Legal Institution Design, 
the objective of which is to “produce Asia-literate professionals who can design legal institutions for 
cross-border transplantation.”: Nagoya University, available at <http://www.law.nagoya-
u.ac.jp/~leading/en/index-e.html>. 
relevant people to pierce a deep culture of confidentiality surrounding legislative 
drafting.79 
III. Judges and “the Project” of Environmental Law 
Interest in how legal norms travel has attempted to incorporate the insight that judges also 
travel and their travel involves “messy and diverse” processes of judicial interaction.80 
Judges clearly occupy a privileged place in legal analysis, yet thinking about judges as 
research subjects exposes still more black boxes. A wide view of transnational law-
making invites questions about judicial practices well beyond written court decisions. 
These questions transcend current interest in “what judges do” that tends to center around 
issues of judicial “independence”, framing “extra-judicial” activities as transgressions.81 
They move analysis beyond the more easily traceable practices of explicit transjudicial 
borrowing reflected in the use of foreign law materials in domestic courts.  
Appreciating the multi-faceted dimensions of the professional lives of judges brings into 
view different dimensions of judicial work including speaking, writing, and advocacy, 
some of which will be directly related to the judicial function (for example, advocating 
for specialized tribunals and the form they should take), some not. Scholars are adopting 
diverse strategies for attempting to access the “black box” of judicial lives outside of their 
courtrooms. Kendall and Sorkin traced financial disclosures to track the sponsors and 
funders of private judicial conferences which “represent a veiled attempt to lobby the 
judiciary under the guise of judicial education”.82 A report on the feasibility and structure 
of a specialized environmental court for England and Wales revealed the involvement of 
a range of judges from other jurisdictions.83 Environmental law perhaps offers a 
particularly vivid exposure to the “project” of environmental protection motivating a 
select group of judges who have taken on openly public advocacy roles speaking in 
                                                          
79 A.R. Gluck & L.S. Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65:5 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 901–1025, 
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80 A.M. Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40:4 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1103–1124, 
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81 J.C. Blue, A Well-Tuned Cymbal? Extrajudicial Political Activity, 18 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL ETHICS 1–63 (2004). 
82 D.T. Kendall & E. Sorkin, Nothing for Free: How Private Judicial Seminars are Undermining 
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REVIEW 405–480, 405 (2001). 
83 M. Grant, ENVIRONMENTAL COURT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (UK Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, 2000), xviii–xix. 
conferences, publishing scholarship as well as writing judicial opinions to advance 
particular environmental law reforms and projects.84 
Little is, however, systematically known about environmental law judges’ efforts to 
influence law and policy as opinion leaders, network builders, publicists and law reform 
advocates --efforts referred to as off-bench judicial mobilization85 -- or about judicial 
practices of off-bench resistance.86 A strong sense of the common ‘project’ of 
environmental protection being advanced through the judiciary can be gleaned from 
articles like Lord Carnwath’s “world tour”87 of exceptional environmental law judges and 
his celebration of the crucial role that “judges for the environment” have to play, both 
individually and collectively.88 It is equally evident from the work and choice of issue 
focus of judicial networks such as the ASEAN Chief Justices’ Roundtable on the 
Environment.89 
Biographies and autobiographies offer additional and valuable glimpses of the people 
who animate the projects of transnational environmental law. Judge Jessup’s refusal to 
clinically separate public and private international law is rendered more palpable from an 
understanding of his prior legal practice that included work as a legal advisor to the 
governments of foreign states at the same time as representing a private non-
governmental organization.90 While still rare, examples of ‘life writing’ by and about 
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90 C. Tietje, A. Brouder, & K. Nowrot (eds.), PHILIP C. JESSUP’S TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVISITED: ON 
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Wittenberg, 2006), 12. 
judges, as well as about international law scholars and practitioners, provide one route 
into this particular black box of transnational law practice.91  
IV.  The Private Lives of Contractual Texts 
A final disparity I draw attention to here is that which exists between growing scholarly 
interest in exploring the significance of global value chains as aspects of environmental 
governance, and the still limited knowledge base of contracting upon which this research 
is based. Environmental law is heavily implicated in global value chains and multiple and 
intersecting sources of law surround and engage with supply chain contracts.92 Yet a full 
scholarly view of how these legal obligations move across time and space through 
contractual practices is hampered by the challenge of accessing private contractual 
texts.93 This is not a problem of shallow or unambitious scholarly efforts. It is a problem 
of the limited access to “private” sources of transnational law. 
In a variety of fields scholars see great potential in contracts as accountability 
mechanisms for private actors operating in international legal spaces.94 Yet scholarship 
and commentary on global value chains may emerge from a limited view of the actual 
content of these contracts. Scholars attempt to find a variety of ways around the problem 
of the “black box” of contractual texts. They may base their analysis on existing 
knowledge of global value chains, rather than the contracts which comprise those 
chains.95 They may analyze contracting practices from standard form contracts that are 
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94 Dickinson, whose scholarship looks at private military contracts, is enthusiastic about the potential of 
contracts governments enter into with non-state actors to include provisions that would help to create both 
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Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 383–426, 386, 402 (2006). 
95 K.B. Sobel-Read, Global Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, 5:3 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
THEORY 364–407 (2014).  
publicly available on corporate websites.96 Or they may ground their analysis in 
interviews of supply chain participants rather than textual review of the contracts 
themselves.97 Scholars also may secure access to a select handful of contractual 
examples,98 or offer a deep analysis based on a single example,99 or rely on codes of 
conduct as a proxy for examining contracts.100 This work is enriched by explicit 
acknowledgment of “the dense veil of confidentiality that often accompanies 
outsourcing” and the significant selection biases that prevent scholarship from being 
generalizable to the broader population of outsourcing deals.101  
Further heroic attempts to provide a fuller view of contracting practices, and texts, emerge 
from the efforts of scholars to use their access as in-house counsel to comment on 
contractual forms102 and from NGOs campaigning for greater transparency and 
contractual disclosure in natural resource project settings.103 In some situations, the 
selective visibility of contracts might be mitigated by access to other sources such as the 
data emerging from interviews of managerial motivations to adopt CSR measures,104 and 
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REVIEW 103–127 (2012). 
from ethnographic accounts of corporate cultures.105 But the generalizability of these 
“partial views” is questionable. The extent of the practical problem of access to private 
contracts is highlighted in contexts such as that of cobalt mining in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo where corporations allege that contractual measures guarantee 
their compliance with human rights standards yet watchdogs are unable to access these 
contracts or measure their implementation.106 
Knowledge of individual, localized contracts can also obscure another reality that only 
meta-analysis might unveil, the extent to which seemingly customized deals incorporate 
pressure for standardization, resulting in the use of standard templates rather than highly 
unique contractual terms.107 Thus, the documentary lens of the deal can “prevent people 
from realizing that deals are not as unique and creative as advertised.”108 Deal documents 
that might appear as “the embodiment of choices” in another light might be seen as 
composed almost entirely of recycled and recyclable parts.109 
The “black boxes” I discuss here were not ones that likely troubled Jessup. He had his 
own. By acknowledging that “secret archives” do exist, and that there is a “larger 
storehouse of rules” worth accessing, Jessup issued an open invitation to continue to think 
about what legal knowledge is not satisfactorily captured in existing understandings of 
private and public international law. Accessing knowledge about law and about legal 
knowledge that operates in any kind of global space is far from straight-forward. It points 
to the complexity of the task facing not only lawyers and legal scholars, but many others 
who are “beginning to ask how precisely can any idea be understood ‘in context’ if 
context is now defined to encompass intercontinental communications, multilingual 
communities, or the expansion of world systems”.110 
E.  CONCLUSION: FROM SEEN/UNSEEN TO KNOWN/UNKNOWABLE 
As this collection of essays celebrating the 60th anniversary of Jessup’s Storrs Lecture 
reveals, transnational law scholarship is full of exciting and far-reaching initiatives to 
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make visible aspects of law-making that narrowly targeted engagements with state-based 
law might miss. This chapter’s perhaps overly sober comments on methodology are not 
designed to take away from the larger celebration of the depth and breadth of new 
knowledge of transnational processes, and of law, that has emerged, inspired by Jessup’s 
own writing.  
Two particular dimensions of transnational law serve as the focal points for this chapter. 
The first is transnational law’s preoccupation with visibility, a concern that permeates 
attempts to transcend narrow conceptions of law, law’s sources, and its relevant actors. 
The second is the privileged place that transnational law reserves for practice. On both 
fronts, there is an opportunity for scholars to be much more forthcoming in articulating 
how a transnational law approach might illuminate new visions of law, and in so doing, 
how it might employ practice. I would suggest that there is much low-hanging fruit here. 
The methodological bases for many practice-based insights are easily known. They are 
just rarely written down. The solution may be sometimes as simple as overcoming a 
reluctance to situate ourselves and our professional lives in our texts.  
It is less obvious how to overcome the challenges of selective vision and partial 
knowledge. Indeed, this chapter’s foray into some of the “black boxes” that complicate 
efforts to understand transnational environmental law-making reveals that, despite best 
efforts, some knowledge of law and legal processes remains off-limits. But scholars are 
finding new and creative ways to access sources and gain forbidden knowledge, as this 
chapter suggests. They are successfully breaking into transnational law’s “black boxes”. 
To conclude, as did Jessup sixty years ago, there is still work for the “headlong scholar” 
to go where the “foreign offices, the legislatures, and the courts” fear to tread.111  
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